Isogeny-based cryptography is a relatively new branch of post-quantum cryptography that makes use of elliptic curves and maps between them. Compared to other post-quantum schemes it is fairly slow (while still being practical for most applications) but uses very little memory; for some schemes the memory requirements are even on par with low-memory classical (meaning not-post-quantum) cryptography. We will look at various failed attempts to cryptanalyze the isogeny-based NIST submission 'SIKE'. We have observed many people rediscovering unsuccessful but natural attacks on this scheme and decided to write up a list of our own failed attempts to save others the time that we invested in these ideas. We will first introduce the mathematical background necessary to understand this scheme and then give an overview of the attack avenues that we have tried. This is joint work with Dr Lorenz Panny.
Dr Chloe Martindale is a Lecturer in Cryptography at the University of Bristol. She obtained her PhD in algebraic number theory in 2018 from both Leiden University and Bordeaux University before moving to Eindhoven University of Technology to do a postdoc in cryptography with Prof. dr. Tanja Lange. She now focusses her research on post-quantum cryptography, with a special focus on isogeny-based cryptography.